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Abstract—Biometric data can be used as “something you are”
in authentication systems, but if a biometric is compromised
by a malicious entity, the genuine user can no longer use it
because it cannot be easily changed. Dynamic biometrics may
offer a practical alternative, as they capture both an inherence
factor along with a changeable knowledge factor in a single
step. This paper investigates dynamic biometrics and whether
they offer useful security authentication properties compared
to conventional biometrics. In particular the paper focuses on
one type of dynamic biometry, authentication based on Gesture
Recognition, and presents a proof of concept experiment. Secu-
rity characteristics of examples from three classes of dynamic
biometrics are compared to a selection of common physiological
(“fixed”) biometrics, leading to the conclusion that in addition to
providing one-step, two factor authentication, dynamic biometry
may provide privacy benefits in some circumstances.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics are often used in authentication solutions to
provide “something you are”. However, attackers may seek
to compromise biometric authentication; possible attacks in-
clude compromise of stored biometric data, or copying/faking
biometrics to fool data capture sensors. The compromise of
a fixed user biometric is a fundamental disadvantage of this
type of authentication, so the use of dynamic (changeable)
biometrics may provide a practical alternative.
The availability of new types of sensors such as depth
cameras, brainwave sensing headsets etc. has generated re-
search interest into dynamic biometrics, as they can be used to
capture inherent factors (physical/behavioral), simultaneously
with a knowledge factor; for example Gesture Recognition
(e.g.[1], [2], [3]). As the knowledge factor is easily changeable,
a dynamic biometric can be changed yet still retain the
advantages of biometric input. It will also provide a means for
one step two factor authentication [4], where only one action is
required to present two authenticating factors to a verifier. This
paper investigates whether dynamic biometrics can provide
security authentication and compares them to fixed biometrics.
Several examples of dynamic biometry are presented, then
one particular category, Gesture Recognition, is subjected
to a more detailed analysis. As Gesture authentication is a
relatively new research area, this paper also includes a proof
of concept experiment, using a Leap Motion [5] depth camera
as a sensor and feature extractor. This core example is then
included in the subsequent security analysis. The security char-
acteristics of several fixed/dynamic biometrics are determined
based on criteria devised by Bonneau et al. [6]. The fixed bio-
metrics included in the analysis are: Fingerprints as they are
well proven and widely used biometric [7]; Face Recognition
also widely used and accepted biometric [7]; Retina as it is
seen as a highly reliable and accurate identifier [8].
This paper is structured as follows: Section II explains the
background about dynamic biometrics and defines its differ-
ent categories. Authentication based on Gesture Recognition,
and a proof of concept experiment follow in Sections III
and IV. Section V shows evaluation criteria and the security
assessment of each biometric. The conclusion and future work
appear in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND: DYNAMIC BIOMETRICS
Our definition of dynamic biometrics is shown below
(other papers have used slightly different definitions e.g. [9]):
A biometric is dynamic when physical/behavioural
(inherent) biometric information is captured together with a
knowledge factor from a user, such that it can be used as the
basis of a one-step two factor authentication.
We introduce the following three dynamic biometric classes:
text based, gesture based, and thought based.
• Text based: Keystroke, Speaker Recognition and touch
screen patterns1 on smart devices are good examples of
this class [4], provided that the text /pattern used has
been chosen by the user. Here, there is both biometric
information (either the keystroke, sound emission or
touch screen speed/ style/ pressure) and something the
user has to know and can change easily, i.e. the text.
• Gesture based: This class can be divided into Gesture
and Signature categories. Gesture: There are several
ways to capture a gesture: for example, by using a
depth camera (described later in this paper); or by using
an electromyograph to capture electric impulses in the
muscle [17]. The knowledge factor is the gesture itself.
Signature: This refers to the capture of the direction,
stroke, pressure, and shape of a signature, through touch
sensitive technologies (such as PDAs or tablets). This
1Touchstroke dynamics is a behavioral biometric based on the style and
rhythm that someone uses to interact with a touchscreen-equipped smartphone.
This authentication method is analysed in [14] and [15], and enhanced in [16]
e.g. by proposing how to handle typos.
Table I
COMPARISON OF GESTURE AUTHENTICATION. FP-BS: FALSE POSITIVE BRUTE FORCE, FP-AK: FALSE POSITIVE ATTACKER KNOWS
Papers Sensor Algorithm TPR FP-BF FP-AK
Chahar et al. [10] Leap Motion Mix of Naive Bayes, NeuralNetwork, Random Decision Forest 81% 1%
Aslan et al. [11] Leap Motion DTW 88.29% 11.71%
Aumi et al. [2] Short range depth sensor DTW 96.6% 3.4% 5.3%
Ducray et al. [3] KinectTM DTW 93% 0% 1.7%
Wu et al. [12] KinectTM DTW 98.11% 1.89%
Tian et al. [13] KinectTM DTW 99% 1% 3%
only matches our definition of a dynamic biometric when
the handwritten text can vary.
• Thought based: Authentication based on brainwave sig-
nals is now a realistic possibility. Several works have
proposed the idea of a "passthought" and have shown
than it is possible to authenticate a person via a specific
thought [18], [19], [20]. Here the knowledge factor is
the particular thought and the inherence factor is the
uniqueness of the brain’s wave emissions [18].
Dynamic biometrics have several advantages; they are easily
changeable due to the knowledge factor, and they allow
one-step two-factor authentication2. However, some categories
of the dynamic biometrics family only use weak physical
biometrics, such as gestures based on upper body geometry
(shoulder length, arms length) which may be a disadvantage
in some situations. Furthermore, any behavioural elements in
the biometric may be observed/copied and knowledge factors
may be forgotten.
The next two sections focus on one type of dynamic biom-
etry, Gesture authentication, to provide a better understanding
of its resistance to attacks by copying.
III. GESTURE AUTHENTICATION
Authentication based on Gesture Recognition requires the
capture of the movement of a user. Different sensors can
be used for this, but the amount of biometric data obtained
varies by sensor type. For instance, gestures recorded using
an accelerometer (e.g. in a mobile phone) do not capture
the geometry of the hand performing the gesture. In this
section, we focus on gestures recorded using depth cameras,
as they provide more “two factor” aspects, i.e. the gesture plus
some physical biometric data. Also, when discussing Gesture
authentication we refer to a user that attempts to mimic
the authentication gesture of another user, as an “attacker”.
Three different kinds of depth camera exist: Structured Light,
Time of Flight and Stereo-Vision [22]. The user has to be
in a position that will allow the sensor to see the user’s
movement. The gesture can be based on different parts of
the body: depending on the system, we can use the full
body [12], the upper body [3], or just the hand(s) [2]. The
user is free to use any form of gesture, but some may
2However the reverse is not true, all one-step two-factor authentications
are not dynamic biometrics e.g. the Bionym wristband allows authentication
via the cardiac rhythm it records plus ownership of the wristband itself [21].
prefer to use their signature [13], although the latter does
not provide the required changeability. The Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) algorithm [23] is frequently used to do the
comparison, but some systems may instead use a mix of
Bayes, Neural Network or Random Decision Forest [10].
Depth cameras include the KinectTM, which is a depth camera
with 20 3D skeleton tracking points. In [3] upper body parts
recorded in the skeleton generated by the KinectTMwere used
for authentication based on Gesture Recognition: using 6 of
the available 20 skeleton tracking points, gave a True Positive
Rate (TPR) of 93%, with 0% False Positive Rate (FPR) if the
attacker did not know the gesture and 1.7% of FPR once the
attacker had seen the gesture. Other authors chose to use all 20
skeleton tracking points from the KinectTM [12] which gave
them a TPR of 98.11% for 1.89% of FPR. The KinectTMwas
used with the DTW algorithm for analysis and recognition of
3D signatures [13], giving 99% of TPR for 1% FPR when the
signature is unknown to the attacker and 3% FPR when the
attacker has full knowledge of the signature.
Furthermore, hand Gesture authentication, accuracy and
attack resistance against shoulder surfing were explored in [2].
In this experiment, reference hand gestures were recorded
using a depth camera, filmed, and shown to a group of
attackers: they were then asked to copy the gestures [2]; here
the FPR was 2.3%.
Table I compares several works on Gesture Recognition
authentication. It shows that TPR varies between 88% to 99%
depending on the method used. The table also shows results
of brute force attacks against these systems (denoted FP-BS),
where attackers attempted to guess a gesture: it can be seen
that this type of attack is very unlikely to succeed. Additionally
if the attacker knows the gesture (denoted FP-AK) the FPR
results vary from 1.7% to 12%.
As Gesture authentication is a relatively new research area,
the next section presents a proof of concept experiment using
a Leap Motion device to capture hand gesture biometrics so
that indicative results can inform the comparison of security
criteria later in the paper.
IV. PRACTICAL EXPERIMENT
A. Methodology
We set up a Gesture Recognition experiment, which, by
using the Leave One Out Cross Validation (LOOCV) compar-
ison technique, produced 90,000 attacks and 10,000 attempts
Figure 1. Model Gestures
at authentication by genuine users; section IV-C gives details
of comparisons. We decided to use the Leap Motion sensor
to monitor hand movements rather than the KinectTMfor full
body gestures. This was a compromise between accuracy
and practicality in common authentication scenarios. Gestures
were captured by a Leap Motion device which tracks and
records hand movements in Three Dimensions (For more
technical information concerning the Leap Motion device
please see [5]). We recorded the (x, y, z) positions of the
palm centre and all five fingers tips and finger roots (i.e. eleven
elements (E) for each frame). A group of 10 volunteers was
asked to reproduce 10 pre-determined gestures ten times. It
is important to note than this experiment was designed to
simulate an attack, so all the participants knew all the gestures.
We devised a set of 10 model gestures ranging from a simple
hand drop, to more complex shapes e.g. drawing a symbol of
infinity, and gave instructions about which hand to use and
positioning of fingers (see Figure 1). Volunteers were given
time to familiarise themselves with the equipment before the
experiment started.
Five gestures were done with an open palm, as follows:
01: Let Right Hand (RH) drop vertically.
02: Make a circle on horizontal plane with Left Hand (LH).
03: Make a square on vertical plane with RH.
04: Make a triangle on horizontal plane with LH.
05: Draw a symbol of infinity on vertical plane with RH.
Another five gestures required variation of finger position,
as follows:
06: Make a circle on horizontal plane with the RH and the
index, middle, ring and little finger straight.
07: Make a square on vertical plane with LH and the index,
middle, ring finger straight.
08: Make a triangle on horizontal plane with LH and the
index, middle finger straight.
09: Draw a "b" on vertical plane with RH and the index
finger straight.
10: Draw a symbol of infinity on vertical plane with RH
and the index finger straight
Figure 2. Graph 1 Two time series (A and B): Graph 2 The warping path
between A and B obtained using the DTW algorithm
In order to accurately record when a gesture starts and stops,
and to ensure that authentication attempts are synchronized
with stored gesture templates, the software waits for an un-
moving hand with five straight fingers before triggering or
stopping the recording. More synchronisation is done auto-
matically during the analysis with the DTW algorithm.
B. Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
In order to compare two gestures, we chose to use the DTW
algorithm, because it requires little training. DTW is reviewed
in [23]. The following is a brief summary of DTW’s properties.
DTW is used to find an optimal alignment between two
time-bound sequences, independently of the variation of time
or speed between both sequences. Originally, this algorithm
was used in speech recognition [24] and its use has been
enlarged to all domains in which data can be modeled in a
linear representation e.g. computer animation, video, audio
and graphics. The interested reader is referred to other works
that have used this method [25]. The capability of finding
an alignment for two sequences which are comparable but not
aligned, is very important when comparing gesture patterns. In
practice, the principle of DTW is to define a warping path with
the minimal cost. This cost is given by the cost function (or
distance function) which is the distance (or the error) between
the two sequences, as shown in Figure 2. In other words, the
DTW algorithm gives us the alignment between the curve
given by the reference model data, and the curve given by
the user’s captured data. which is given by:
(1)γ (m,n) = d(m,n) +min(γ (m− 1, n− 1);
γ(m− 1, n); γ(m,n− 1))
Where: γ (m;n) is an (M +1)× (N +1) matrix; γ (0;n)
and γ (m; 0) are initialised with zero or a large number which
represents infinity, depending on the application; γ (0; 0) with
zero; d(m;n) is the cost function.
C. The Analysis
We will use these definitions in the analysis:
Gesture set G will refer to the reference gesture and is
composed of G=(g1, g2, ..., g10) with #G representing here
the number of elements in the set G i.e. 10.
User set U refers to the users and is composed of
U=(u1, u2, ..., u10) with #U representing here the number of
elements in the set U 10.
Sample set S will refer to what a user produced for a
specific gesture. It is composed of S=(s(gi,uj ,1), s(gi,uj ,2), ...,
s(gi,uj ,10)), where gi is a specific element of G and uj is a
specific element of U, with #S(gi,uj) = 10.
At the end of the experiment, we used the LOOCV
method, and obtained 100,000 comparisons, given by
#G× (#S(gi,uj) ×#P )2.
Out of these 100,000 comparisons 10,000 were attempts at
authentication from the genuine user (#G×#S2(gi,uj)×#U )
and 90,000 were attacks (#G×#S2(gi,uj)×#U × (#U −1)),
giving our FPR.
To assess TPR we focused our attention on a single user at
a time; given a specific gesture, each user had 10 samples in
the testing set for that gesture. The TPR is when the genuine
owner of a gesture was authenticated correctly, for a fixed
threshold θ. To assess FPR we look at many users at a time.
Given a specific gesture, we isolated a sample from one user
and compared all the other samples from all the other users and
considered them as attackers. The FPR was when an attacker
successfully authenticated for a fixed threshold θ. So TPR and
FPR can be represented as:
TPR =
NU < θ
TotalU
, FPR =
NA < θ
TotalA
(2)
Where NU is the number of gestures from the genuine user
below the threshold θ and NA is the number of gestures from
attackers below θ.
The next section discusses the experimental results.
Figure 3. ROC curves of the Full Hand Gesture authentication.
D. Experimental Results
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve shows the
performance of a biometric, by plotting TPR against FPR as
the threshold is varied. The ROC curve we obtained is shown
in Figure 3: It can be seen that for a TPR of 10 we have
FPR of 0; that is due to the comparison of a user’s gesture
with itself which should always give us the minimal score i.e.
0. The asymptotic part takes a long time to reach the rate of
100, which means some of the samples are distant compared to
other samples from the same user’s gesture. This was possibly
due to several users having difficulties using the Leap Motion
for the first time. The users had not been given extensive
training, as we chose DTW because we wished to minimise
the training given and we were interested in how untrained
users reacted to a relatively unfamiliar device. Figure 3 shows
an EER of 11.88%. From the analysis of the ROC curve, we
determined the optimal threshold, here we will continue to use
the EER. With these respective thresholds, we find the global
TPR= 88.12% and the FPR 11.88% for hand gestures. These
results are not ideal, but referring to Table 1, it can be seen
that they are closely comparable to prior art research using the
Leap Motion sensor. More accurate results would have been
expected from a KinectTMexperiment.
Having explored Gesture authentication in detail, we now
describe the evaluation criteria that will be used in assessing
security characteristics of dynamic biometrics.
V. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
The evaluation of dynamic biometrics will be based on
security criteria outlined in the work of Bonneau et al. [6],
along with additional security criteria that are particularly
relevant to dynamic biometry. We have chosen to include
in this comparison one example of each dynamic biometric
class. We chose Speaker Recognition rather than keystroke
recognition or touch screen because it is easily deployable
over existing communications infrastructure (the telephone
system) [29] and stable over various devices (Keystroke and
Table II
COMPARISON OF BIOMETRICS.
Physical Biometrics Dynamic Biometrics
Fingerprint
Recognition
Face
Recognition
Retina
Recognition
Speaker
Recognition Passthought
Gesture
Recognition
Resilient-to-Physical-Observation High Low High Low High Medium
Resilient-to-Targeted-
Impersonation Low [26] Low [27] High Medium Medium Medium
Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing Low Low High Low Low Low
Resilient-to-Theft Medium [26] High High High High High
Requiring-Explicit-Consent Medium Low [27] High [28] Medium High High
Unlinkable Low Low Low Medium Medium Medium [3]
One Step Two Factor No No No Yes Yes Yes
Changeable No No No Yes Yes Yes
False Positive Rate 0.2% [28] 0.1% [28] 0.0000001% [8] 2%-5% [28] 2% [19] 0%-3.4%
True Positive Rate 99.8% [28] 90% [28] 99.9999999% [8] 80-90% [28] 98% [19] 81%-99%
touch screen are not)3. We selected Gesture Recognition and
Passthought as they are both relatively new research areas.
Note that we expand our definition of ‘attacker’ here to refer
to an individual who attempts to obtain biometrics information
by any method (not just copying) in order to successfully
authenticate instead of the genuine user.
A. Evaluation Criteria
• Resilient-to-Physical-Observation: if an attacker is
present when the genuine user is authenticating, they
should not be able to capture any useful information.
We rate a biometric as High if no information can be
captured, Medium if some information could be captured
and Low if almost all the information can be captured.
• Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation: if an attacker has
investigated background information about the genuine
user, they should not be able to use this successfully
in authentication. We rate a biometric as High if no
information can be captured, Medium if some information
could be captured and Low if almost all the information
can be captured.
• Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing: an attacker should not
be authenticated if they are able to have an unlimited
number of tries. We rate a biometric as High if the
attacker would need more than 220 attempts, Medium if
they need more than 210 attempts and Low they need less
than 210 attempts.
• Resilient-to-Theft: If the system uses a physical object
for authentication (i.e. reader, keyboard, etc.), this object
should not give any information to an attacker if they get
access to it. We rate a biometric as High if it does not
need any physical object or than the object does not keep
any information, Medium if the biometric might require
an object that an attacker could get information from,
and Low if the biometric always needs an object that an
attacker could potentially get information from.
• Requiring-Explicit-Consent: Here we rate a biometric
High if it needs the full consent of the user to start an
3However, touch screen biometrics on smart phone devices exhibit many
of the same characteristics as speaker recognition
authentication process, Medium if the biometric can be
used to authenticate without the consent of the user only
by using subterfuge, and Low if the biometric can be
used to authenticate without the consent of the user.
• Unlinkable: For privacy, it should not be possible for
colluding verifiers to determine if the same user is au-
thenticating to both their systems. We rate a biometric as
High if there is no linkability, Medium if it is linkable in
some circumstances and Low if it is totally linkable.
• One Step Two Factor: Does the biometric combine two
factors in one step? (yes or no)
• Changeable: Can the biometric be changed and reused for
authentication in the case of compromise? (yes or no)
• FPR/TPR: FPR - an attacker successfully authenticates;
TPR - a genuine user successfully authenticates.
B. Evaluation of Biometrics
The following analysis has been summarised in Table II.
• Resilient-to-Physical-Observation: We rated Fingerprint
and Retina as High, along with Passthought: for
Passthought an observer cannot capture what the user is
thinking as there is no device yet that can capture brain
waves at a distance. Gesture Recognition is rated medium,
as although an observer can see/observe/record a gesture,
they cannot use a recording directly to get authenticated.
Face and Speaker Recognition are rated Low.
• Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation: Retina is rated High
as it is difficult for an attacker to find out the blood vessel
pattern. Speaker Recognition, Passthought and Gesture
are Medium because the attacker may be able to discover
information relevant to the specific thought and gesture
but that would not be enough to perform an attack.
Fingerprint and Face Recognition are rated Low as it
would be easy for an attacker to find a picture [27] and
a latent Fingerprint [26] to impersonate a user.
• Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing: Here we will use FPR
data with the formula given in [30] to calculate the
keyspace which is 1/FPR = keyspace. We base our
ratings on the following calculated keyspaces: Finger-
print 28.97, Face Recognition 26.7, Retina 229.89, Speaker
Recognition goes from 24.35 to 25.65, Passthought 25.65.
Gesture4 ranges from 24.9 to 26.65.
• Resilient-to-Theft: All the biometrics analysed here do
not required any contact with an object or leave any
information on it, with the exception of Fingerprint. This
leaves some latent prints on the reader, which provides a
way to attack it [26]5.
• Requiring-Explicit-Consent: Retina scanning requires the
user to look into an eye-piece and focus on a specific
spot [28]: we rate this High. Similarly, a High rating
was given for Passthought and Gesture as it would
be difficult for a attacker to authenticate without user
consent. Fingerprint is rated Medium as an attacker could
trick a genuine user into touching a reader to initiate
an authentication. Speaker Recognition is rated Medium
because an attacker could use a hidden microphone to
authenticate as a genuine user without their consent. Face
Recognition is rated Low as an attacker could authenticate
using an easily obtained photo of the user taken without
their consent [27].
• Unlinkable: By definition, biometrics are related to a
particular user, so all ‘fixed’ biometrics are rated Low.
However, some dynamic biometrics use weak inherent
biometric factors: for example Gesture Recognition may
involve some body measurements such as arm length or
shoulder width [3] which are not sufficient for a unique
identification of a user. This make them better for privacy.
Also the inclusion of a knowledge factor in dynamic
biometrics means that the same inherent factor to be used
with different secrets at different verifiers. Consequently,
all dynamic biometrics are rated Medium.
• One Step Two Factors: None of the physical biometrics
can be used in a One Step Two Factor authentication, but
by definition any dynamic biometric can.
• Changeable: Physical biometrics cannot be changed at the
wish of the user. With dynamic biometrics the knowledge
factor can be easily changed.
• FPR and TPR: For Fingerprint, Face, Speaker Recogniton
we based this section on [28]. For Retina, the error rate
is 0.0000001% [8] so we can assume than the FPR is
the same and the TPR is 99.9999999%. Passthought [19]
found a FPR of 2% and a TPR of 98%. For Gesture
Recognition we used the range of values from Table I.
C. Security of Dynamic vs ‘Fixed’ Biometrics
The data shown in Table II highlights some important issues.
There have always been concerns about privacy and linka-
bility of biometrics, and that once compromised, a biometric
credential becomes unusable by the genuine user. These are
addressed by dynamic biometrics, and it can be seen from
the table that this new family of biometrics outperforms some
traditional biometrics in a number of respects. For example,
our rating of Face Recognition is equal to or lower than all the
4An FPR of 0% was found in [3], i.e. a very high keyspace, but we feel
that this value needs to be confirmed by further experiments.
5This is also a disadvantage in touch screen biometrics.
dynamic biometrics assessed, for all security criteria identified.
Also, Passthought could rival Retina Recognition in terms of
security, being ranked lower in only two criteria, resilient-to-
targeted-impersonation and resilient-to-unthrottled-guessing.
All the dynamic biometry categories were ranked Medium
in the resilient-to-targeted-impersonation criterion, better than
Fingerprint and Face Recognition. Naturally, not all biometrics
are suitable for all authentication situations: conventional
biometric techniques are typically used for applications with
higher security requirements than dynamic biometrics. For
example, as Gesture authentication is vulnerable to ‘shoulder-
surfing’ (copying) attacks it would not be suitable for use in
busy public environments but would be a plausible option for
video games. Passthought currently requires fairly intrusive
use of hardware so may not be a good option for day-to-day
use. Dynamic biometrics are by definition capable of providing
One-step Two Factor Authentication, and the use of a secret
knowledge factor brings some privacy benefits in comparison
to ‘fixed’ biometrics: additionally the use of weak inherent
biometric data in gestures will also improve unlinkability.
VI. CONCLUSION
A major security issue with ‘fixed’ biometrics occurs if
biometric data is compromised so the use of a changeable,
dynamic biometric may provide a practical alternative. This
paper investigated how the security of dynamic biometrics
compares to conventional biometrics. Several examples of
dynamic biometry were presented, and one category, Gesture
Recognition was analysed in more detail. As Gesture authen-
tication is a relatively new research area, a proof of concept
experiment was described, which used a Leap Motion [5]
depth camera as a sensor and feature extractor. An attacker
mimicking a known gesture had 11.88% likelihood of a
successful attack, whilst a genuine user had a 88.12% chance
to be correctly authenticated. These initial results were a
little disappointing, however they were comparable to prior-
art research using the Leap Motion sensor. Evaluation criteria
devised by Bonneau et al. [6] were then used as a basis to
assess the security of several fixed/dynamic biometrics. The
inclusion of a knowledge factor in a dynamic biometric brings
some privacy benefits in comparison to ‘fixed’ biometrics, in
addition to making the biometric changeable. Unlinkability
improves a) because the same physical characteristic can be
used at different verifiers with different secret knowledge, and
b) by using weak inherent biometric data in some dynamic
biometrics (e.g. in Gesture Recognition). In future work, we
intend to extend the proof of concept experiment using a larger
sample of volunteers, and implement a secure system using
authentication based on Gesture Recognition.
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